Reacción a "Bonobo Kanzi shows that the ability to imagine is not unique to humans"

This study provides one of the clearest pieces of experimental evidence to date of secondary representations in an individual of another species. For years, anecdotal observations have accumulated of chimpanzees and bonobos interacting with imaginary objects (from playing with invisible cubes in the laboratory to treating sticks as if they were dolls), but experimental demonstrations were lacking. Bastos and Krupenye's work with Kanzi takes that step, showing that a bonobo can maintain and update imagined states superimposed on immediate reality.

The design is conceptually simple: Kanzi alternated between reinforced trials (where he was given a reward) and non-reinforced trials (without a reward), in which he had to indicate the location of imaginary juice or food after observing actions of “pretending to pour into a glass”. Although performance was below 70% in the main experiments (1 and 3), this level is to be expected in an experiment of this nature, which lends itself easily to distractions and attentional variability.

From a broader perspective, this work illustrates the difficulties inherent in studying imagination in other species. Exploring the imagination of other species requires designs that are inevitably deeply shaped by our own way of interacting with the world. It is no coincidence that the experiment relies on an exceptional subject such as Kanzi (who sadly passed away in 2025), trained to communicate with humans: here, language acts as a window into his mind, similar to what happened with Alex, the African grey parrot who revealed to the world the fascinating mind of birds.

That is why I believe the study says a lot about us and our limitations. Not only has it been necessary to work with Kanzi, but the experimental design itself is profoundly “human”. In the main experiment, an imaginary juice is poured into a glass with a jug; this is a far cry from the ways in which great apes must use secondary representations in nature.

There is experimental evidence of monkeys capable of mentally manipulating visual figures, and also of rats capable of voluntarily activating internal representations of their environment. All of this suggests that these abilities may not be unique to great apes. The challenge, as we move away from our own species, is to design species-specific experiments that allow us to evaluate them without resorting to overly anthropocentric frameworks. We will need designs that move away from the ease of asking “where is the juice”. It will be a matter of time and creativity on the part of scientists before we can have an answer.