The study is sound in most of its methodology and deals with an extremely interesting topic, not only because of the introspection it allows about our natural way of thinking, but also because of the ethical and ecological implications.

In our eagerness to interpret the world around us, humans naturally project our own behavior and motivations when interpreting the behavior of others, be they humans, animals or objects. When we apply these predictions to objects or creatures that do not belong to our species, then we speak of anthropomorphism because, in a way, we give human form to these behaviors.

This is obviously useful, since it allows us to predict that, if we throw a stone at a lion, it will become furious and attack us, even though we have not experienced it first hand. We do not need to know how a lion's mind works, it is enough to assume that it will behave as we would.

Of course, this also leads us to make mistakes, especially when we do not know the ecology of the species in question. These range from mostly harmless mistakes (as in those very popular videos in which a swan appears to voluntarily feed the fish, when they are actually stealing its food) to others with dramatic consequences (such as the popularization and exploitation in the media of the expression of terror of some primate species, which uniquely resembles the human smile).

This more serious side of anthropomorphism is very important to keep in mind, as the degree of anthropomorphism we project to some species and others seems to have to do with the importance we attach to them. This, of course, is extremely important for conservation (as the authors point out), as well as for animal welfare.

Although we know about the existence and limitations of anthropomorphism, we know less about its development and the factors that influence it. This study aims to explore this topic further and provide information on the correlation of anthropomorphism with factors such as level of socialization, religion, educational level and others.

The authors do a good job of acknowledging the limitations of their own study. Perhaps the most obvious is the fact that they used the number of Facebook contacts to assess how socially integrated the study participants were. This is something they justify as being “something widely used in other studies, even with young participants.” Although this is not the only measure employed, I will leave it to the reader to weigh how wrong this decision is.

But the limitation I find most important has to do with the characteristics they encompass within the anthropomorphism category.

The authors have used the IDAQ (Individual Differences in Anthropomorphism Questionnaire) originally designed to be applied to all sorts of non-human items that might be subject to anthropomorphism; from a coffee pot that doesn't work “because it doesn't want to”, to rain that “decides to fall” just as one has finished washing the car. They have rightly expanded this questionnaire to make it somewhat more suitable for assessing anthropomorphism attributed to animals.

Throughout the article (as well as its press release) anthropomorphism is described as an attribution of properly human characteristics to other species, something that -according to the authors- is reduced by increasing the level of education and contact with animals. Thus, direct contact and education reduce the erroneous attribution of human characteristics to other species.

The problem with all this is that this work includes characteristics that are widely recognized in other species and mixes them with others that are perfectly justifiable. If the authors find that more education correlates with less belief that nonhuman animals have autonomy, we should ask not how education does to reduce anthropomorphism, but why anthroponegation increases with education.

Anthroponegation is a term coined by the primatologist Frans de Waal to refer to the attitude contrary to anthropomorphism. If anthropomorphism is characterized by the attribution of human characteristics to other species, anthroponegation is the error of not attributing them when we should do so.

Thus, characteristics such as intentionality, the ability to feel pain, to make decisions, to be infected by the emotions of others and even to have subjective experiences have a solid scientific basis in other species. Other characteristics reported in the questionnaire are confusing. One example is the attribution of secondary emotions (those that emerge when thinking about primary emotions). Although some secondary emotions are common in erroneous anthropomorphistic attitudes (such as the attribution of shame in pet dogs after breaking or soiling something), others do have scientific evidence (such as that a dog may feel jealous of another dog that receives more attention).

If we take this study only for what the data tell us, then we have an interesting study from which to extract more or less revealing information about how urbanization, religion, social connections, education or contact with other species correlate with the beliefs people have about their resemblance to humans. In these beliefs there will be rights and wrongs. If the authors had put it that way I would have no problem with it. But the article deals with anthropomorphism from a perspective that is always negative and from which anthroponegation does not seem to exist. This leads to a methodology and results that end up being confusing and jeopardize any conclusions we can draw from the study.